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Abstract
As electronic commerce becomes a reality, additional services related to electronic commerce will
also emerge. The current paper proposes the provision of electronic strongboxes as an integrated part
of the wider electronic commerce. The strongbox
concept is introduced as an electronic counterpart
of physical strongboxes typically found in large traditional financial institutions, such as banks, having secure vaults or other secure physical storage.
The work identifies some requirements of electronic
strongboxes both from the functionality perspective
and from the security point of view. A simple framework for' an electronic strongbox system is also presented.
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1

Introduction

Electronic commerce on the Internet has become
one of the major issues in computing in the last
few years. The development of the world-wide-web
technology and its related browsers has transformed
the idea of commerce and trading on electronic media into a reality. The vast opportunities presented
by electronic commerce can be easily gauged by the
amount of serious interest shown by the business sector and by researchers in the field of computing.
In the business sector the number of Internet Service
IThe author is also at the tJniversity of Western SydneyMacarthur, NSW 2560, Australia.
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Providers have increased dramatically, responding to
the ever greater number of people wishing to "connect to the net". The term netu'ork computer has
been coined to capture the duality of the nature of
personal computers today, namely as a desktop compu ter and as a gateway to the world of the Internet.
From the computer research sector quite a number proposals have been put forward for the immediate use of the Internet as a payment media
through which users can carry-out transactions and
payments linked to the existing physical financial infrastructure (eg. DigiCash [1, 2], ih:P [:3]. 0:etBill [4]
and SET [5]- to name a few). Other schemes suggest the use of electronic cash or coins to be used
as a circulating currency on the Internet (eg. \etCash/NetCheque [6,7]).
As electronic commerce becomes a major actIvity
on the Internet (and other interconnected networks).
users will demand other related services to be delivered through and by the Internet. We perceive that
one such service will be the provision of electronic
strongboxes as a counterpart to the existing physical
strongboxes, typically found in large financial institutiop..s.
In the traditional financial sector the prOVISion of
strongboxes has been in service for sometime. Customers can apply to have a private strongbox held
within a bank, in which the customer can place any
type and any amount of valuables, subject only to
the physical characteristics of the strongbox. The
bank typically has no interest in the contents of the
strongbox, and it derives income from providing safe
st.orage and access to such strongboxes. The identity of the strongbox customer and the fact of the
customer having a strongbox are usually treated as
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confidential by the bank.
In this paper we carry-over the notion of strongboxes
from the physical reality into the digital world. We
propose the introduction of electronic strongboxes
on the Internet as an integrated part of the electronic commerce infrastructure. It is our belief that
electronic strongboxes can play an important role
for the safe keeping of important items (in their
electronic representation). We identify some functional requirements of electronic strongboxes which
bear some resemblance to that of electronic payment
protocols (Section 3 and Section 4). In addition, we
present a simple framework for an electronic strongbox system, describing some of the basic interactions
among the participants of the system (Section 5).
The security requirements of this system is briefly
discussed in Section 6. In Section 7 some security
technology considerations related to the implementation of electronic strongboxes are discussed. Some
remarks and conclusions in Section 8 end the paper.

provide the electronic strongbox sen-ice to their
tomers on the Internet. Customers may apply
such a strongbox over the Internet. and payment
the service can be done using electronic cash or
electronic payment forms. The customer would t
have access to their respective strongboxes over
Internet, using secure browsers which allow them
place electronic items in their strongbox. There
almost no limit to the variety of electronic items
can be stored in an electronic strongbox. Some
the typical items may include:
• Electronic coins or cash
• Electronic bank cheques
• Digital documents (eg. contracts I
• Anonymous digital certificates of ownership of
physical items
• Cryptographic material to access other services

2

Lockers along the SuperHighway

In today's banking world the proVIsIOn of strongboxes for customers is a common occurrence. Customers typically place important items, such as jewelry and important documents, in strongboxes. Access to the strongboxes is dependent on the bank
that provides the strongbox service. Usually, a bank
would require a customer to identify himself or herself before access is provided. Ideally, however, access should be provided to any person when that
person reveals a key that is recognized by the bank.
Hence, anonymity of the carrier of the key is guaranteed. With the physical strongbox storage, two
general approaches are usually provided:
• Customer access to a private environment containing all the non-removable strongboxes (ie.
drawers).
• Customer access only to their own removable
strongbox, within a private environment (ie. actual boxes)
With the current interest among the business community in conducting trade on the Internet, the notion of an electronic version -of strongboxes is an
interesting and attractive one. In the _electronic
world, and within the context of electronic _commerce, banks and other certified organizations would
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A customer may have multiple strongboxes, each
at differing institutions along the electronic "superhighway". Access can be provide for 24-hours per
day, and the customer would be able to move items
among her or his own collection of strongboxes, or
two customers can exchange items that will be stored
in their respective strongboxes.
Similar to the physical world, in the electronic world
access can be delegated by a customer to another
person by way of the customer giving the access key
(or its suitable derivative) to that person. In such
circumstances, the person carrying the key can access the corresponding strongbox while remaining
anonymous to the institution.
A third party maybe appointed for such cases when
disputes occur between an owner of a strongbox
and the institution that maintains the strongbox.
This may occur, for example, when a dishonest user
claims that his or her access key has a matching
strongbox within the bank, or when the bank inapropriately denies access to a valid owner of strongbox.
Other institutions may act as valuers and converters of legal physical items where valuable items (eg.
gold) are given a valuation and an electronic certificate for the item is generated. The same institution
may also provide long-term safe storage for the physical items, whilst the anonymous owner uses the electronic certificate on the Internet. The certificate can
then be used for personal trade or Barter, which is
something common in everyday life. In this context,
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• The owner is given the entire strongbox which
she or he must open using the key, after which
he or she may obtain individual items (which
must be deciphered).

can play an important role in facilitatthose non-monetary commerce in an untraceable
G:na3JeU"." Legal items may also be advertised anonyas being "For Sale" over the Internet, with
the valuers and other trusted third parties being the
point of contact. In effect, these strongboxes can become a type of secure "public storage" media, where
individuals can disperse their electronic properties
all over the Internet, with the storage management
and the actual location of their physical data being
transparent to the user.
The concept of anonymous storage itself is not new.
The early work by Brandt et al [8] points to the benefits of anonymous and verifiable databases, particularly in the context of privacy against government
bodies that wish to cross-correlate data belonging to
individuals in society. In [8] the true identity of each
individual remains unknown and the individual employed a different pseudonym (9] when dealing with
each government body or institution. The main feature of the work was that each individual must also
have the ability to verify that his or her personal
details held by an institution are correct. Further
related work has also been reported in [10].

~:

However, one underlying difference between the
anonymous/verifiable database concept and the
public strongbox concept is the privacy of the data.
In the anonymous/verifiable database, it is intended
that the institution that maintains the database
view the data belonging to the users, whilst at the
same time maintaining the anonymity of the users.
The users can the verify that the database contains
correct data about the user. A typical example
would be a hospital database containing sensitive
medical data belonging to patients. A patient may
have personal details that are important for medical
requirements (eg. blood type, diabetes, etc), but at
the same time the anonymity of the patient must be
upheld to prevent discrimination against some patients with serious illness (eg. cancer, HIV, etc) that
could affect their entitlements (eg. health insurance,
medical benefits, -etc) and affect their social standing. In contrast, in the electronic strongbox concept
the contents of the strongbox must remain private,
with the users still remaining anonymous and being
able to verify and modify (insert/remove) the contents of his or her strongbox at anytime.
In general, electronic items stored in a strongbox
should be enciphered individually by its owner before they are placed in the strongbox. This approach would then allow strongbox access to be implemented in two ways:
-

• The owner "delegates" the institution to open
his or her strongbox and to deliver to the
owner specific (encrypted) items. The institution remains unable to view the specific item
requested, as the items are enciphered by the
owner.

3

Functional Requirements

There are a number of basic requirements which
must be fulfilled by electronic strongboxes, following the requirements of their physical counterpart.
These are listed and briefly discussed in the followmg.

3.1

Anonymity

Al Anonymity of ou'ner.
The owner must always remain anonymous, and
the fact that she or he owns a strongbox must
also remain a private fact. },lethods to create
pseudonyms exist in other forms of electronic
commerce which can be used in the strongbox
case.
A2 Anonymity of I.:ey holder.
The key holder is the user that presents a valid
key to the bank to access a strongbox held by
the bank. The bank has the right to verify that
the key fits into one of its strongboxes, and to
deny access if the verification fails. The key
holder can be the owner of the strongbox or any
other user delegated to access the strongbox by
its owner.

3.2

Privacy

PI Privacy of strongbox contents.
As in the case of physical strongboxes, the contents of the strongbox should remain undisclosed to all parties except the key holder opening it using a valid key. Any system implementing the strongbox should ensure that the
institution providing the service does not have
backdoor or other hidden channels to access or
view the contents of the electronic strongbox.

,

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In addition, the strongbox should be tamperresistant from the institution itself, who might
attempt to illegally remove or add items to the
strongbox. This may be achieved using cryptographic techniques (eg. hashing, signing) to
provide the owner with proof and assurance
that the strongbox has not been tampered with
since it was last accessed.
In the physical world, some level of trust exists between the bank and strongbox owner,
whereby the owner relies on the bank not to
place hidden cameras designed to view the
strongbox contents and that the bank will not
tamper with the strongbox. Ideally, such trust
should also exist between a customer and the
strongbox provider, similar to the level of trust
between merchant and acquirer [3, .5].
P2 Privacy of strongbox locations.
A user may have multiple strongboxes scattered
all over the Internet under different guarding
institutions. The locations of these strongboxes
should be private information, available only to
the owner (or any other delegated user) and the
respective institutions. One institution should
not be aware that its customer also owns strongboxes elsewhere.

P3 Access to strongbox only by a key holder.
The institution must without exception provide
access to the strongbox only to the key holder
that presents a valid key.
A security mechanism must be employed to provide at least two levels of verification, namely at
the point of request for access to the strongbox,
and later at the point of the opening strongboxes. These two levels can be implemented
cryptographically, and should eliminate possibilities of procedural errors.

P4 Storage of a variety of electronic items.
An electronic strongbox should be able to store
a variety of digital items, subject only to the
agreed storage space limitations. Even such
limitations should be easily and immediately
negotiable when a user reaches his or her storage limit.
System parameters that protect the strongboxes must be maintained under secure and
tamper-free storage at the institution.
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3.3

Contents Transferability

Cl Items exchangeable between strongboxes.
Analogous to the physical counterpart, electronic strongboxes must allmv for the exchange
of items between two (or more) strongboxes.
Strongboxes may belong to the same owner, or
they may belong to different owners who are
working together.
C2 Untraceability of moved items.

Since the contents of strongboxes must remain
private, moved items must then be untrace-·
able. Untraceability should hold regardless of
how many times an item has been moved between strongboxes, and regardless whether or
not the item finds its way into a strongbox
within which it previously resided. That is, a
strongbox should not have a "memory" of its
previous con ten ts.

3.4

Delegations

Dl Strongbox key can be delegated.
Similar to the physical strongboxes, any person'
carrying the appropriate key must be able .
open the electronic strongbox. Ideally strong- .
boxes should even allow stolen keys to be used,"
as the issue of protecting keys is separate from
user anonymity.
In the banking sector some banks do provided .
the owner with some protection against stolen
.
keys. However, methods that require user'
tification can also result in the user's .
being revealed.
In electronic strongboxes, delegation should
provided, whereby an owner of the strongb
can delegate another user to become a
holder in order to access the owner's st
box. Both users must remain anonymous.
the same time, delegation schemes must have
limited lifetime or the ability to be revoked
the owner [11].
Single-use keys may provide a solution, in
delegated keys are derived from the original
and where the bank holding the strongbox
aware of a key being a derivative, and
allow only one-off access to a given stLV""'U'~'O"
Multiple-use keys may also be devised,
technology similar to electronic coins.
usage of the key would reduce its
until it is diminished when it reaches its
mum number of usages.
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Additional Functional Requirements
. The flexibility of the digital world presents a num. • ber of opportunities to provide features of e1ec. tronic strongboxes which are infeasible or difficult
to achieve in the physical world.

4.1

Movable strongboxes

Electronic strongboxes should be be movable between institutions, similar to the way electronic cash
or coins are movable around the Internet. An owner
of a strongbox must be able either to move the entire
strongbox without opening it, or to shift the contents of one strongbox at one institution to another
strongbox under a different institution. Both alternatives are attractive, and both should be available
to the user, depending on the user's circumstances.
Security, privacy and anonymity must be ensured in
both cases.

4.2

Notification to the owner

Although the owner of a strongbox must remain anonymous through the use of pseudonyms.
they must be available for notifications via their
pseudonym. Notifications may include:
• Notification (confirmation) that the owner's
strongbox was accessed at a particular date and
time (or a failed attempt was made to access the
strongbox).
• Notification of fees that are due to be paid by
an owner of a strongbox

4.3

Electronic charges

Owners of strongboxes pay their fees using electronic
currency. This can be done on a periodic basis,
or long-term payments can be made upon the commencement of the strongbox.
When an owner is absent from the Internet for a
long period or when the owner fails to answer notifications concerning overdue fees, the institution may
take the strongbox off-line and keep it on secondary
storage (eg. dump into CD-ROM). When the owner
in future requests access to the owner's strongbox,
the institution can bring the strongbox on-line only
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after the due fees are paid by : ie owner. Proving
ownership can be through the a.::::""s key in the usual
manner. Disputes with regarl:~ :0 payments must
be resolved through a third pa:::: acceptable to the
owner and the institution .

4.4

Designation of heir

An owner of a strongbox shouk. :,e able to designate
another valid pseudonym as a:, heir to be notified
and given access in the case tin, the owner dies or
the strongbox is never accessec oYer a long period
of time (eg. years). This shou;(\ occur if no prior
arrangement was made by the ,'wner with the institution regarding very infreque::: access, and if the
owner fails to respond to the ':::crious notifications
about fees that are due. Other ;'~ocedures must also
be applied in the case that the j.esignated heir fails
to respond. In all these cases. t :::' ,.'resence of a third
party such as a lawyer or not 3::: \\"ould be required
as in the usual case.
The issue of property inherit3:::;:' in the electronic
world remains an interesting ,'~'en problem. both
from the legal aspect and from; ;le economic aspect
(eg. taxation in certain countri",,) [12].

5

A Simple Franlework for a
Strongbox Syst.elll

In this section we propose a ~imple frame\\'ork for
a strongbox system (Figure 1'. using components
( ie. participants) typically found in electronic commerce systems. All electronic interactions between
participants are assumed to be over a secure channel, with peer authentication (,'nJucted at the commencement of communication~. The current proposal does not pretend to be .:,'mprehensive. and it
attempts to address the main l','mponents only. Additional components will be required to support the
framework to achieve full workability.
The participants of the system are as follows:
• Customer: the customer or user, interacting
with the Strongbox Provider (eg. Bank) for the
safekeeping of electronic items.
• Strongbox Provider: an institution that provides
the electronic strongbox sen'ice to a customer.
• Valuer: the on-line Valuer is trusted to verify
that an electronic item belonging to an owner
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Figure 1: Electronic strongbox system
(ie. Customer) truly exists and has not been
modified by its current owner. The Valuer can
also be requested to split items into several subitems, and issue certificates for them. Several
Valuers may exist on-line, and each must recognize the other's certification.
• Exchange Facilitator: the Exchange Facilitator

aids two or more Customers who wish to exchange items from their strongboxes. The Facilitator can be a Strongbox Provider and is under
the jurisdiction of the Association.
• Association: the Strongbox Providers and the

Valuer work under the umbrella of the Association. Customers bring disputes to the Association.
In addition, there are the Physical Valuer and the
Notary which are in the physical world and interfaced to the electronic world. The Physical Valuer
should be distinct from the on-line Valuer as the
Physical Valuer knows what a physical item constitutes and which pseudonym forwarded the physical item to be valued. The Physical Valuer stores
the physical items at the Secure Physical Storage,
to which the Association has access in the case of
disputes. The Notary comes in on behalf of a Customer when disputes necessitates their presence. In
the remainder of this paper, uniess otherwise stated,
the term "Valuer" will refer-to the on-line Valuer (as
opposed to the Physical Valuer).
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The Customer is the owner of the contents of a
strongbox and is deemed also as the owner of t
strongbox. The Customer obtains membership
the system through the Association which .
the Customer with the credentials (eg. within a
smartcard) and with a pseudonym to be used within
the system. The Customer henceforth employs thIS
pseudonym when using the system. The Associa-tion may in fact be that which exists in the electronic commerce infrastructure and which oversees
the usual electronic trading, purchases and payment.
The Customer joins the strongbox service by opening an account with the Strongbox Provider, which
can be a Bank or other institutions having the necessary computer infrastructure to provide this service.
In order to bring an item into the system the Customer must first obtain a valuation of the physical
item to the Physical Valuer. The Physical Valuer
issues the Customer with a digital certificate corresponding to the physical item. This certificate is
recognized and accepted by all participants in the
system. If requested, the Physical Valuer may attach a monetary value to each item, which may then
be described in the certificate. The actual physical
item itself is kept in the Secure Physical Storage,
under the control of the Physical Valuer and/or the
Association. Any Customer presenting an electronic
certificate for a physical item can obtain the item
from the Physical Valuer or through the Association.
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_ . The unit of the physical item to be valued and certi. ned must be agreed upon between the Customer and
_ -the Physical Valuer (eg. six bars of gold can be writ.... ten under one certificate, or six certificates can be
produced corresponding to the ~ix physical item~).
Having small units for the valuatIOn allows for easier
usage of the items at a later date. However, should
a Customer wish to break-up an electronic item into
·several reasonable components - bearing in mind the
physical reality of the item - the .Customer c~n approach the on-line Valuer to obtam such services.
Here, although ideally any physical item should
be allowed to be introduced into circulation, social/economic stability and order demands that illegal items (eg. drugs) be prevented from entering
the electronic system. This prevention can be conducted at the Physical Valuer interface.
It remains an interesting and open problem as to
whether a Customer must prove ownership of legal
items. The extent to which electronic strongboxes
should mimic physical strongboxes, particularly in
the case of stolen goods, must be decided by authorities implementing the system.

Once within the system the certificate is referred to
as an electronic item. \Vhat the item constitutes and
who holds the item presently must remain confidential. A Customer can store the electronic item with
any Strongbox Provider, assuming he or she already
has a strongbox account with them.
When two or more Customers have agreed to exchange items, they can carry-out the exchange of
the corresponding electronic items through the Exchange Facilitator. Ideally, before an exchange occurs, the Customers should prove the possession of
the items to each other (eg. via zero-knowledge pro. '. tocols). However, even without such pre-exchange
confirmation of possession, the Exchange Facilitator
must be able to ensure that no cheating occurs. The
Facilitator must inform each Customer as to the electronic items it has received for the exchange instance
(to prevent cheating), and the Facilitator must also
provide a guarantee of non-repudiation should one
, (or both) Customer dispute the exchange. The Facilitator can be a trusted third party, or it can be one
of the Strongbox Providers selected by both Customers.
The use of the Exchange Facilitator is optional. Customers can perform any exchange of items directly
. among themselves, through a secure channel. However, without the Exchange Facilitator disputes cannot be resolved and the burden of risks lie fully with

_r',W...."U\

Association

the Customers.

6

Security Requirements for
the Strongbox System

Similar to electronic payment systems, a number of
security requirements exist for the strongbox system to be reliable and workable. It goes without
saying that the authentication of participants holds
an important place before any interaction can occur. The impossibility of forging of electronic items
must be guaranteed throughout the system. Finally.
the requirement of undeniability of actions (or nonrepudiation) carried-out by participants in the'system. Some of the other more specific requirements
are briefly presen ted in the following.

Strongbox Provider Requirements

• Proof of the retrieval of a strongbol·. The
Provider must have some form of proof that
a strongbox is currently being "checked-out".
That is, that the strongbox has been retrieved
and is currently in the possession of the Customer. This is to prevent the Customer from
claiming otherwise and therefore forcing the
Provider to take account of losses. This notion
is similar to that of the forging of electronic cash
or coins, or to that of denying that payments
have or have not been made.
The retrieve and store operations must exhibit
the typical transaction properties of atomicity,
consistency, isolation and durability [13. 14].
A further aspect that must be taken into consideration is the allowable length of time for a
strongbox to be held (checked-out) by its owner
and the implications on security. Given that a
Customer typically knows the contents of his
or her strongbox - either from human memory
or through a list stored securely (eg. within
a smartcard) - it is reasonable to assume that
the check-out and check-in should occur within
the span of a single transaction. A reasonable
timespan would similar to that in which a merchant expects immediate payment from a purchaser.
• Verification of access key of the strongbox. Before providing a key holder with access to the
claimed strongbox, the Provider must have sufficient proof that the requester (ie. owner
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or their delegate) is a valid party within the
system. That is, the requester has a valid
pseudonym and can be authenticated. The
Provider must also verify that the key is a recognized and valid key.
One potential problem would be the possibility
of the illegal duplication of access information.
That is, the potential that more than one access key exists at any time. Current technology
can solve this problem either through smartcard
systems or through the provision of a single-use
access keys for the strongboxes. In the later
case, a new access key needs to be generated
each time a strongbox is retrieved and stored.

other Customer via the Exchange Facilitator,
both Customers must have sufficient proof that.
the exchange occurred correctly in such a way'
that neither party can deny the transaction.

Valuer Requirements
• Proof that valued" item and valuation result has
been received by Customer. This is to prevent a
Customer accusing the on-line Valuer of stealing
an item submitted for valuation.

Exchange Facilitator Requirements
• Proof of exchange transaction. Corresponding
to the proofs required by a Customer for the
exchange of an item, the Facilitator requires
proof of the submission of the items to be exchanged, and more importantly proof of the
delivery and receipt of the items after the exchange. This proof must come from all involved
Customers, and serves as protection for the Facilitator against false claims by the Customers.

Customer Requirements
• Unauthorized retrieval of strongbox IS Impossible. A Customer must have the assurance
that the unauthorized checking-out of his or her
strongbox is impossible. Stolen electronic items
should be prevented from circulating without
being detected.
Depending on the implementation, the certificate corresponding to the item may carry the
pseudonym of its current owner (see the next
Section). Since the certificate is unforgeably
signed by the Valuer, stolen electronic items
may be detected later at an Exchange Facilitator, a Valuer or at a Physical Valuer. A possible
safe-guard can be implemented at the physical
end, when Customers convert their electronic
items back into physical items currently being
stored in the secure physical storage.
• Proof of storage by the Prol'ider. A Customer
requires some proof in the form of a receipt that
his or her strongbox has been correctly checkedin and that the Provider now holds the strongbox.
• Proof of valuation. When an electronic item
undergoes valuation or when it is split by the
Valuer into several electronic sub-items, a Customer owning the item (and thus the sub-items)
requires proof that the Valuer currently holds
the item, and also proof that the valuation has
been carried-out. Clearly the Valuer itself must
be a certified one and be authenticated by the
Customer before any valuation transactions occur.
• Proof of exchange tmnsaction. When a Customer carries-out an exchange of items with an-
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7

Technological
Strongboxes

Issues

for

There are a vast number of issues related to the concept of electronic strongboxes and their implementation. It is beyond the scope of this introductory
paper to cover each of them. Some of these, however,
are briefly discussed in the following.

7.1

Representation
Items

of

Electronic

There are many ways to represent items electronically. One possible method would be to employ two
types of certificates for each item:
• Item Certificate: this is the electronic item itself in the shape of an unforgeable certificate
and having a one-to-one correspondence with
the physical item. The Item Certificate carries
the signature of the Physical Valuer and is cosigned by an on-line Valuer.
• Description Certificate: this IS a certificate
guaranteeing that a given item exists somewhere in the system. The certificate may con-
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tain a digest or hash of the Item Certificate,
and is signed by the on-line Valuer. The certificate may contain the pseudonym of the current
owner.
The two certificates are inseparable and should be
stored together in the strongboxes. The aim of having a Description Certificate is to allow one Customer to prove its ownership to another Customer
before an exchange occurs. During an exchange,
both certificates are handed-over as an item unit.
The concept is derived from the idea of certified photocopies of important documents (eg. passports)
which are often required for government and legal
purposes. Periodically the Description Certificate
must be renewed by way of the Item Certificate being reconfirmed by the on-line Valuer.
Similar to electronic cash, some form of serial numbering may be applied to all electronic items systemwide, to prevent illegal copying of certified items by
its current owner. This must be done with the precaution that the serial numbers do not become way
to trace the movement of items [15J.
Upon an exchange between two Customers the Exchange Facilitator may request an on-line Valuer to
re-certify electronic items as belonging to their new
owners respectively. For each electronic item, both
the Item Certificate and the Description Certificate
must be signed by the on-line Valuer. The Description Certificate will then contain the pseudonym of
the new owner of the corresponding item.
Note that no identity information, such as the
pseudonym, is mentioned anywhere within the Item
Certificate. Thus, the current owner of the Item Certificate may at any time obtain the actual physical
item by presenting the Item Certificate to the Physical Valuer. The Physical Valuer must then inform
the on-line Valuer of the removal of the item (via its
serial number) from circulation within the electronic
world.

7.2

Security on the User's Side

Security - or the lack of it - is currently one of
the main obstacles to achieving the full use of electronic commerce on the Internet. Large financial institutions such Banks have the necessary resources
to establish a reasonable level of security for their
computing systems. However, security on the user's
side is lacking. The vision of millions of users on
their workstations or Home PCs conducting elec-

tronic commerce or trade must first address the need
of trusted computing technologies at the user's end.
There a number of potential approaches that can be
taken to provide security at the user's end:
• Tamper-resistant technology. Tamper-resistant
boxes can be provided as part of the internal
hardware for the typical PC or Network Computer (NC). Smartcards can then be used to
load specific security parameters to such boxes.
The challenge in the future lies in making these
affordable.
• Access terminals. Institutions can provide access terminals in the manner of Automatic
Teller }'lachines. Besides providing physical security. such terminals can be available at the
institution's premises. Although practical. this
approach somewhat defeats the convenience of
conducting electronic commerce from the user's
desktop.
• Probe software. Although a contentious issue.
the notion of down-Ioadable self-executing softwarc> is an ::lttr::lcti\'e one. Here. an institution or a trusted third party can provide autoexecutables which can be down-loaded (eg. via
a browser) and \\"hich can perform automatic
remote scanning or probing of a user's workstation or PCj;';'C to evaluate its security. This
notion can be extended to situations where the
software reboots the workstation and loads a
specific secure operating system for the workstation. After the session, the previous local operating system can be reloaded. How this concept and its implementation can be extended
over wide networks - and how acceptable it will
be to the user community from the privacy perspective - remains to be seen.

7.3

Multilevel Secure Strongboxes

The idea of multiple strongbox providers lends immediately to the notion that strongboxes can have
differing levels of security and therefore cost of
maintaining them. The frequency of access also
plays an influence on the costs of the strongboxes.
User's \\"ith less valuable items may choose cheaper
and "weaker" strongboxes, while for their expensive items they may choose the strongest strongboxes froU1 the variety of strongbox Providers.
Each strongbox Provider may offer either a uniform
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strongbox type or provide differing levels of strongboxes.

8

Remarks and Conclusion

Having proposed electronic strongboxes as part of
the electronic commerce infrastructure, this paper has attempted to identify some the functional
and security requirements of electronic strongboxes.
This effort does not pretend to be comprehensive,
as there are a number of issues that remain to
be resolved in the wider context of electronic commerce, and also within the specific scope of electronic
strongboxes. It also does not ignore the fact that difficulties exist in any design and implementation of
the concept. vVe believe, however, that the concept
should be tied closely to developments in electronic
commerce and payment systems, as these areas will
represent the infrastructure within \vhich the electronic strongbox concept can be comfortably implemented. The current paper has presented a simple
framework for an electronic strongbox system, taking the more familiar participants from electronic
payment systems.
The provision of electronic strongboxes as a service
should not be too far in the future, as the security
technology to implement it has partly arrived accompanying electronic commerce. There are a variety of
issues which must be addressed to realize strongboxes in the wider context of electronic commerce.
Some of these issue include, but not limited to:
• Anonymity of Customers, while providing the
various features of electronic strongboxes.
• Interfacing electronic strongboxes with physical strongboxes at the Secure Physical Storage
component.
• Value of items versus strongbox costs.
• Key escrowing of strongbox-keys by governments in some countries.
• Legal status of strongboxes when the owners are
foreign nationals.
• Transferability of strongboxes across national
boundaries.
• Item exchanges over national boundaries and
the type of Exchange F.acilitators that will thus
be needed.
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• Effects of converting electronic items back into
physical items when the new owners are foreign
citizens and its legal implications.
.
• Valuer infrastructure required for an international strongbox system.
These issues will be the subject for continuing research as they are important for the economic viability and technical feasibility of the electronic strongbox concept.
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